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On 28 October 2020, Tanzania held a pivotal election. In one sense, no Tanzanian election 
has ever been pivotal. None has ever led to an alternation in power between government and 
opposition. Since it won independence from the United Kingdom in 1961, Tanzania has been ruled 
by the same party, now known as CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, or the Party of the Revolution). Until 
1992, CCM ruled through a formally single-party regime. Since then, it has ruled through an ostensibly 
multiparty regime by deploying authoritarian measures to maintain an electoral lead. 
Regarding the bottom line, this approach has worked—CCM has won all its elections. Yet by 
2015, the approach was proving increasingly unsustainable—CCM had steadily lost ground at the 
polls. In 2005, it won the presidential election with an unassailable 80 percent of the vote; the leading 




opposition candidate won only 12 percent. Ten years later, CCM’s vote share fell to 58 percent, while 
the leading opposition candidate’s rose to 40 percent. For all CCM’s advantages, its support was 
shrinking. 
In this sense, the 2020 election was pivotal. CCM rolled back its losses. President John Pombe 
Magufuli (1958-2021) won a second five-year term with 84 percent of the official vote, the highest 
share recorded in a presidential election since multipartyism was reintroduced three decades ago. In 
the parliamentary contests, CCM’s gains were even more overwhelming. It won 93 percent of the 
elected seats in the National Assembly.1 The party had gained a similar proportion of the local-council 
seats, and 99 percent of the local-government positions in 2019. Altogether, CCM is now just digits 
away from being the only party to hold any elected offices. Tanzania’s single-party history feels as 
contemporary as ever.2 
The CCM sweep was an authoritarian landslide, achieved through electoral manipulation that 
was unprecedented in both scale and audacity. This was unaccompanied by high levels of violent 
oppression. One opposition report names fifteen people who were killed by state-security forces and 
paramilitary groups during and immediately after the campaign in Zanzibar.3 A subsequent, as yet 
unpublished report shared with me by another opposition party repeats thirteen of those fifteen 
names, and names twelve further people thus killed across Tanzania.4 These victim-lists have not been 
independently verified in their entirety, but Tanzania Election Watch (TEW), an independent panel 
of eminent persons from East Africa, gives a similar figure. It determines that altogether, at least 22 
were killed.5 This all took place in a national climate that had become steadily more authoritarian since 
2015. 
This election, however, is not only significant because of the apparent electoral fraud 
perpetrated and harms wrought in its execution. It is significant for the turning point to which it 





amounts. It marks Tanzania’s transition from a partly authoritarian regime in which electoral 
competition is permitted, to a fully authoritarian regime in which, de facto, it is not. Multipartyism has 
been pulverized. CCM domination has been forcibly restored.  
On the 17th of March 2021, Magufuli died in office, just as this essay went to print. Magufuli 
was the public face of tyranny in Tanzania. His death raises the possibility, however faint, that CCM 
might alter the ultra-authoritarian course that it had chartered through the 2020 election. Yet in that 
course one can trace a new strategy of power. CCM used to use authoritarian actions to give itself a 
sufficient lead to carry elections. In 2020, however, the party far surpassed the plurality and majority 
thresholds of victory. Its goal was not merely to win the election, but to annihilate the opposition. In 
other words, one can read a rationale for a greater authoritarian turn into CCM’s actions. While 
Magufuli is gone, the rationale remains. In fact, if anything, his death has only strengthened it. 
The 2020 election and Magufuli’s sudden demise will alter what politics takes place where in 
the future. Opposition will be driven abroad, online, and underground. Contests for power will further 
shift from the interparty to the intraparty realm. In sum, the 2020 election was a revelatory event. It 
shed light on what has happened, what CCM is doing now, and what is likely to come next. 
 
RIGGING THE ELECTION 
 
The struggle for power in Tanzania, Africa’s fifth-largest nation, took place amid a struggle of 
ideas. In this struggle, President Magufuli took a major role. In his eyes, his election in 2015 had come 
at a critical moment for the nation. CCM had strayed from its historic mission by permitting too much 
economic privatization and political liberalization. This had made Tanzania prey to exploitation by 
domestic businesses and foreign imperialists. He also perceived CCM to be at a critical point, having 
lost support for two election cycles, as the Table shows. 




In 2015, Magufuli had presented his presidency as a break with the past. He had promised that 
there would be “only work here.” He had launched a war against the “corrupt” on behalf of the 
“downtrodden.” Some have interpreted this as the populist construction of a struggle between “the 
people” and “the [corrupt] elite,”6 but Magufuli presented his project in subtly different terms. He 
envisaged corruption not at the pinnacle of his government, but beneath it in the depths of the ruling 
party, the bureaucracy, and the business world. He painted himself and CCM’s top leadership as the 
steward or vanguard elite, whose role it was to root out “the corrupt” below them.7  
Magufuli said that this house-cleaning would be the initial step in a campaign to restore the 
agenda of Julius Nyerere (1922–99), Tanzania’s first president. During his decades in power, between 
the early 1960s and the mid-1980s, Nyerere advocated “socialism and self-reliance.” Magufuli 
selectively interpreted Nyerere’s program, omitting its socialism while preserving the ideals of state-
led developmentalism, national self-reliance, and at times, south-south cooperation.8 He and his party 
envisaged Nyerere’s plan as the transformation of Tanzania into a modern, industrialized state free 
from dependence on foreigners. They delivered roads, dams, factories, trains, and even planes—they 
revived the national airline. It now flies De Havilland turboprops, Airbus jets and a pair of wide-body 
Boeing 787 Dreamliners out of renovated and expanded Julius Nyerere International Airport in Dar 
es Salaam. All these things were presented as icons of national development.9 The ruling party’s 2020 
campaign celebrated these achievements. The party’s message was that it had delivered, but had more 
to do. The “only work here” slogan of 2015 turned into 2020’s “work continues.”  
The opposition embraced rival political projects. The second-largest opposition party, Alliance 
for Change and Transparency (ACT-Wazalendo) is led by Zitto Kabwe. From his stronghold in 
Kigoma (western Tanzania) he advocated the revival of Nyerere’s project as socialist. Playing off 
Magufuli’s slogan, he called for both “work and duck,” or jobs and prosperity. ACT-Wazalendo was 





also the strongest opposition party in Zanzibar, the majority-Muslim nation that joined Tanganyika to 
form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964. Nationalists from this semi-autonomous coastal 
archipelago, which is home to an estimated 1.7 million of Tanzania’s 59.7 million people, were led by 
Seif Sharif Hamad until his death in February 2021. They demanded more independence from the 
union (Tanzania-wide) government for Zanzibar. They joined ACT-Wazalendo in 2019 after being 
marginalized in their previous party by a rival faction that the regime had assisted at every turn. ACT-
Wazalendo nominated Hamad to run for the (subnational) presidency of Zanzibar. 
The strongest opposition party on the mainland was the Party of Democracy and 
Development (known as Chadema, its Swahili acronym). Chadema made sizeable gains in the elections 
of 2010 and 2015. It lampooned CCM’s cherished projects as so many white elephants. It criticized 
the ruling party’s “development of things,” and advocated instead the “development of people.” As 
its 2020 standard-bearer, Chadema chose the outspoken lawyer, human-rights activist, and 2017 
assassination-attempt survivor, Tundu Lissu.  
Chadema and ACT-Wazalendo bridged their differences by finding a common cause: 
democracy. Midway through the campaign, they formed an informal electoral alliance that they 
presented as the united front of resistance against dictatorship. On this unofficial ticket, Lissu was the 
candidate for the presidency of Tanzania and Hamad for the presidency of Zanzibar. 
  




Table. Tanzanian National Election Results, 1995-2020 
Election Party Presidential Parliamentary 
1995 CCM 61.8% 80.2% 
 Opposition 38.2% 19.8% 
2000 CCM 71.7% 87.5% 
 Opposition 28.3% 12.6% 
2005 CCM 80.3% 88.8% 
 Opposition 19.7% 11.2% 
2010 CCM 62.8% 77.8% 
 Opposition 37.2% 22.2% 
2015 CCM 58.5% 73.4% 
 Opposition 41.5% 26.6% 
2020 CCM 84.4% 97.0% 
 Opposition 15.6% 3.0% 
Notes: Results summarize the national share of the presidential vote and the share of directly elected 
parliamentary seats, excluding “special seats” allocated in proportion to national vote shares. 
Opposition-party results are aggregated for simplicity. Numbers are rounded to one decimal place. 
Sources: Tanzania’s National Electoral Commission and Sterling Roop and Keith Weghorst, “The 2015 
National Elections in Tanzania,” Electoral Studies 43 (April 2016): 190–94. Also see footnote number 
one. 
 
Opposition and civic voices alleged that in 2020, any link between this struggle of ideas and 
the electoral struggle for power was severed. They claimed that the election had been a fraud. On 
social media and in press releases, they shared evidence of numerous forms of cheating. Their ability 
to observe and verify fraud systematically was impeded, however. First, opposition polling-place 
observers had been obstructed en masse, some denied accreditation in advance, others barred from 
entry. Lissu said that Chadema polling agents had been barred all day from about 57,900 of the 80,000 
polling stations, and barred for part of the day from a further 12,000 stations.10 (These statistics have 





not been independently verified to my knowledge, though TEW determines that polling agent 
exclusion was “widespread”.) A partial internet blockage came into effect on election eve and lasted 
until results were declared, which frustrated the timely-reporting of irregularities. 
Second, the National Electoral Commission (NEC), which ought to be integral to the 
prevention and investigation of possible election fraud, lacks independence. Its members are 
nominally nonpartisan, but they are appointed and dismissed unilaterally by the president. Third, legal 
means cannot be used to address election fraud, because Article 74, Section 12 of the 1977 
Constitution declares that “no court shall have power to inquire into anything done by the Electoral 
Commission in the discharge of its functions.”  
What about election observers? The state prohibited some domestic bodies from observing 
the 2020 election, notably Tanzania Episcopal Conference and the Legal and Human Rights Centre. 
It further broke with precedent by not responding to the EU’s application to accredit an observer 
mission. The East African Community and the Southern African Development Community sent 
missions. In their preliminary statements, however, these gave the election a clean bill of health 
without so much as acknowledging the fraud allegations, other than to ask that stakeholders use legal 
channels to “settle any disputes.” The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) 
also sent a mission, and alone voiced (limited) misgivings. Leaving aside that partial exception, it is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that CCM only allowed observers that were biased in its favor. Many of 
these irregularities are summarized in TEW’s final report.11  
The regime’s foreclosure of every line of investigation made assessing the reality and scale of 
electoral fraud impossible. This enshrouding of the electoral process cut both ways: Electoral 
manipulation could not be verified, but neither could its absence. As a result, Tanzania’s elections lost 
their integrity. Under such circumstances, the opposition’s allegations should be granted prima facie 




credence. As verification has been precluded, the only means by which one can assess the validity of 
the election is judgment. With this in mind, the probability that CCM manipulated the results is 
increased by the magnitude of the victory that it officially claimed. The results show CCM not only 
coming close to erasing the opposition at the national level, but also piling up huge margins of victory 
in longtime opposition strongholds. This stretches the credibility of the election very thin indeed. It is 
far more likely that the government perpetrated large-scale rigging than that CCM pulled off such 
constituency-level swings. 
 
ENDING ELECTORAL COMPETITION 
 
At first glance, widespread electoral manipulation in Tanzania might seem unremarkable. After 
all, even as it reintroduced multiparty elections in 1992, CCM preserved much of the preceding 
authoritarian architecture, and has built on it since. Through it, CCM has remained fused with the 
state, which it runs in its own favor. State-led development is treated as CCM-led development. The 
party monopolizes state rents, which supply funds for its election campaigns.12 It uses state ownership 
of media outlets and state regulatory powers over the media to guarantee itself favorable coverage.  
The opposition, meanwhile, faces constant harassment. Its meetings broken up while the 
government accuses it of stoking civil strife. Opposition-friendly businesses are denied permits and 
state contracts, while opposition supporters find themselves cut off from access everyday state services 
and benefits. Critical autonomous associations are targeted for similar treatment. Supplementing this 
overt repression are covert campaigns of persecution involving abductions and low-level attacks. Such 
is the varied freight of CCM’s authoritarian omnibus. In ways large and small, public and secret, it 
seeks to hobble its opponents.  





Before 2020, however, apparent electoral manipulation in Tanzania (at least on the mainland) 
remained limited. The ruling party found that its advantages brought ballot-box victories without the 
need for large-scale rigging. Despite many fraud allegations, available evidence suggests that rigging 
was selective rather than widespread. Yonatan Morse wrote in 2019 that “while Tanzanian elections 
are not clearly democratic, they are far from the stereotype of sham elections seen elsewhere.”13 The 
2020 election, therefore, marks a turning point. For the first time, there appears to have been 
systematic manipulation of a Tanzanian election at the national level. 
In 2020, apparent electoral fraud went hand-in-hand with the intensification of the ruling 
party’s other strategies of oppression. As I described in these pages four years ago, CCM initiated an 
authoritarian turn in 2015. The party was its original author and initiated it during the tenure of 
Magufuli’s predecessor. Upon his election, Magufuli embraced and pursued it.14 This program began 
with legislation giving the state additional authority to silence journalists, civil associations, and civic 
activists. Officials made lavish use of these new powers, along with older ones, to quell dissent at a 
pace that broke with the recent past. The ruling party closed avenues by which opposition politicians 
could communicate with citizens. It asphyxiated their access to both new and old media. It tied them 
up in court cases and jail sentences. It banned rallies by all save sitting MPs. 
Naked violence was part of the mix, too. Civic and opposition activists were frequently 
arrested, intimidated, and beaten by the police. “Unknown assailants” (many suspected to come from 
state-sponsored paramilitary groups) attacked, abducted, tortured, or killed CCM’s critics. A pair of 
2019 reports, one from Human Rights Watch and one from Amnesty International, catalogue these 
brutal curtailments of civic space.15 In this context, many opposition politicians, defected to CCM. 
Altogether, CCM oversaw a many-pronged authoritarian program that increased in extremity from 
2015 until 2020. 




This greater authoritarian turn continued into the election campaign and its aftermath. Going 
into the 2019 local elections, Chadema declared a boycott of the polls after accusing officials of having 
spuriously disqualified 94 percent of its candidates. ACT-Wazalendo boycotted as well. In 2020, 
officials prevented many prospective opposition candidates from filing their nomination forms, and 
rejected many submitted forms. Opposition leaders told me that all told, Chadema had lost 63 
prospective parliamentary candidates to these tactics, while ACT-Wazalendo had lost a hundred. (Of 
these, 36 from Chadema and at least 39 from ACT-Wazalendo won reinstatement on appeal.)16 
Similarly, Chadema planned to run 3,754 local-council candidates, only to have more than a quarter 
(1,020) kept off the ballot. Of these, only 165 managed to secure reinstatement. 
The NEC issued campaigning bans of five and seven days, respectively, to Hamad and Lissu. 
After the results were announced, the opposition called for nationwide “peace marches,” but these 
never materialized—a grim testament, perhaps, to what a campaign of midnight arrests and unbridled 
state force can do to suppress free assembly. Indeed, the unpublished Chadema report described 
above names – by my count - 314 persons whom the police took into custody in the election and 
surrounding period. Of these, 31 were denied bail, 88 were charged with unbailable offences, 122 were 
detained illegally, and 50 were tortured. It names a further 112 victims of violence, of whom 71 were 
assaulted, 37 were tortured and four disappeared.17 ACT-Wazalendo’s report names further victims. 
After eliminating those named in both reports, it lists three further assaults, 131 further detentions, 
and 25 further abductions.18 These names and statistics have not been independently verified to my 
knowledge, but TEW corroborates the thrust of these findings. In response to this oppression, many 
opposition figures went into hiding. 
The events of 2020 represented a sharpening of CCM’s authoritarian turn. Past analyses 
interpreted CCM’s authoritarian actions as the tilting of an already “unleveled playfield” (to borrow 





Alexander Makulilo’s term) further in CCM’s favor. Makulilo argues that the party-state militates 
against the “effective operations of opposition parties.”19 Nonetheless, without unduly idealizing the 
tenure of Magufuli’s predecessors,20 analysts agree that CCM permitted at least minimal levels of 
competition and respected at least minimal civil and political liberties, albeit imperfectly. Analysts 
characterized Tanzania’s regime not just as authoritarian, but competitive authoritarian, to capture this 
reality that a non-negligible amount of competition was permitted.21 How else could the opposition 
have gained such strength by 2015?  
In the light of the 2020 election, such assessments need to be revised. The regime did not just 
grant itself a competitive advantage—it occluded competition altogether. It did not tilt the playing 
field; it closed the field and locked the gate. Tanzania went from a regime in which opposition and 
dissent were tolerated to one in which they were not. In political-science parlance, the system has 
metamorphosed from a competitive electoral authoritarian regime to a hegemonic one,22 or as Steven 
Levitsky and Lucan Way would call it, a “fully authoritarian regime.”23 These changes have brought 
into being a state of affairs on the mainland that has long been a reality in Zanzibar, even as repression 
there has intensified still more. 
It may be that this was CCM’s strategy all along—that it always planned to fall back on rigging 
if it felt the need. If so, beneath this change of regime behavior lay a continuity of intent, of regime 
resolve. Intent is hard to observe, however. Often we can only infer it. In this case, the continuity in 
question hinges on a past conditional—What might CCM have done had it felt electorally threatened 
earlier? This casts the matter even further in the direction of the unknowable. This is one reason why 
regime typologies take behavior rather than intentions as their defining criteria.24 
 




BREAKING THE DYNAMIC 
 
Questions of classification aside, the ruling party’s conduct during the election reveals 
something about its apparent intentions in 2020. Past analyses of CCM strategy interpreted the party’s 
authoritarian behavior as a means to win elections. I myself wrote in these pages that CCM was 
“drastically narrow[ing] political space to reduce the likelihood of an opposition victory.”25 The goal 
of electoral victory was surpassed by such a wide margin in 2020, however, that assessments of CCM’s 
activity should be rethought. Perhaps CCM overshot its goal out of simple miscalculation, or, as 
Ansbert Ngurumo suggests, out of paranoia.26 Or perhaps the scale of manipulation was the product 
of many lines of action, each initiated individually, that overdelivered collectively. 
Tanzania’s upper political echelons shroud their deliberations in a secrecy that outsiders rarely 
penetrate. Therefore, one can only speculate about CCM’s true motives. Nonetheless, there is another 
possible explanation for CCM’s actions that ascribes neither miscalculation nor coordination failure, 
but strategy. The premise of this explanation is that to ensure its longevity, an authoritarian regime 
should not just win elections, but win them sustainably. The key to sustainable winning, in turn, is 
discretion. That is, such regimes should use authoritarian methods that are covert rather than overt.27  
If, however, the opposition grows popular despite all the regime’s discreet methods, as 
happened in Tanzania, the regime’s viability comes into question. Either it can accept the prospect of 
losing elections, or it can resort to blatant methods such as widespread rigging. Such conspicuous 
manipulation, however, may provoke opposition protest. Then the regime faces a second unpalatable 
choice: It can respond with repression, which will erode its legitimacy, or it can make concessions, 
which will erode its power. Either way, it will be starting a cycle that is likely to recur. Thereby, the 
regime becomes locked into an unsustainable dynamic like that theorized by Andreas Schedler.28 





There were two pertinent reasons for CCM to have concluded that it was on such a path. The 
first was Zanzibar. The cycle of opposition gains, rigging, protest, and electoral reforms of successive 
Zanzibari elections closely resembled one variant of the sequence described above. The second was 
Chadema. Between 2006 and 2015, Chadema not only became popular; it organized. Through this 
apparatus, it met and matched the canvassing effort of the famously well-organized CCM in 2015.29   
Many speculated that Magufuli’s mood-catching platform and authoritarian program would 
cut deeply into the opposition’s popularity. This could not be confirmed or rejected through surveys, 
because Tanzanian respondents overreport CCM support to survey takers, and because in 2018 CCM 
put a de facto ban on opinion polls. This kept the question of opposition popularity open. In this 
context, Chadema held rallies which, at first sight, were comparable in size to both its 2015 rallies and 
CCM’s own. So did ACT-Wazalendo in Zanzibar. Rallies are poor bellwethers of popular support 
even in Tanzania, which has the most rally-intensive campaigns in the world. Nonetheless, Chadema’s 
rallies were consistently large enough to support this negative inference: Chadema and ACT-
Wazalendo support had not collapsed. Whatever their true popularity, at least some core of their 
support had endured despite everything CCM had thrown into the effort to undercut it. 
For CCM, this raised a chilling possibility: The opposition had become indomitable. The more 
CCM tried to tilt the field and take the high ground, the harder the opposition would eventually climb. 
The heavier CCM cracked down, the stronger the opposition would rise up. This is the spirit of 
indefatigable rebellion that Lissu sometimes captured in his outspoken presidential campaign. If this 
were the case, then CCM would no longer have a sustainable means of allowing electoral competition 
while continuing to ensure itself of winning. It would be on the brink of the cycle of rigging and 
protest followed by repression or reform that would incrementally undermine its rule.  




Grasping this, CCM may have resolved on extraordinary measures to break out of this 
dynamic. This provides a rationale that is consistent with CCM’s actions. In order to avoid a future in 
which it would lose power, CCM may have sought to make a future opposition victory seem not 
merely unlikely, but impossible. 
The regime’s actions in 2020 narrowed the opposition’s apparent possibilities on several levels. 
On a practical level, the opposition’s exclusion from elected offices left it starved of the salaries, local-
government posts, and media coverage on which it thrived.30 On the level of appearances, CCM’s 
astounding showing gave it an unprecedented mandate. The towering results painted CCM as 
unassailably popular and the opposition as ruinously unpopular. This lengthened the odds against a 
near-term opposition victory. On a third level, the apparent scale of electoral manipulation tacitly told 
the opposition of CCM’s resolve: The regime will grant itself landslides, come what may. Similarly, the 
audacity of CCM’s actions displayed its impunity. It could stuff ballots and shoot protestors without 
fear of sanction. 
The actions of CCM affect not only the near-term but the long-term prospects of opposition 
victory. A common opposition strategy is to respond to rigging with protest to bounce authoritarian 
regimes into electoral reforms. This presupposes, however, that the regime will choose reform over 
exposure and violence. By rigging elections audaciously and crushing protests violently, CCM held its 
hand to the flame. It showed itself willing to absorb the worst costs that the opposition could ever 
inflict upon it, and thus signaled that there was no way the opposition could make it adopt electoral 
reforms. 
On each of these levels, CCM has sent the same implicit message: It will never, ever be beaten. 
If opposition activists read and accept this message, they may give up and disband. They risk hardships 
because they have hope. If CCM makes opposition seem futile, it makes activism not only hazardous 





but hopeless. This demobilizing message would undo the organizational and ideational progress that 
the opposition has made over the last fifteen years. For CCM, this would be an achievement worthy 
of Houdini. It would deliver the party from the trap of rigging and protest followed by repression or 
reform in which it was gradually being ensnared. In light of such a strategy, the apparent magnitude 
and brazenness of CCM’s authoritarian conduct would make sense. This strategy supposes that rising 
opposition strength had made CCM’s prior strategy unsustainable, and that a massive act of 
domination would break the opposition’s spirit and restore the sustainability of its rule. 
Ultimately, it remains a matter of speculation whether CCM decided to adopt its ultra-
authoritarian course out of error, fear, or strategy. President Magufuli, however, had a record of 
decisiveness and strategic ingenuity which is consistent with this account of events. This record plus 
CCM’s six decades in power all makes it more likely (in the absence of conclusive evidence either way) 
that the regime’s actions are a matter more of method than mistake.  
Assuming what I have described above to be CCM’s rationale, it would have been formulated 
amid a changing international context. As African countries made transitions to multipartism 
following the Cold War, Western countries exercised considerable power. They compelled African 
states to enact successive neoliberal economic reforms, and to adhere to democratic constitutions. 
Three decades on, Western power has ebbed. In an increasingly multipolar world, African states need 
support from Western ones less. Those Western states, meanwhile, place increasingly more emphasis 
on economic gain and less on democracy promotion in their foreign policies. This adds up to a West 
that has lost its appetite for confrontations with autocratizing African regimes.  
Since 2015, CCM has repeatedly tested the resolve of Western states and transnational bodies 
as it has enacted its authoritarian program. With each step, the party has found them hesitant to act. 
In fact, CCM has limited freedoms, cut off political competition, and inflated its own power without 




meeting much more than token and fleeting Western resistance. If CCM’s shift from competitive to 
hegemonic authoritarianism turned on a cost-benefit analysis, the record of Western inaction clearly 
reduced the apparent costs. 
To say that CCM may have chosen its authoritarian direction strategically is not to say that it 
reduced the possible courses, costs, and benefits to matters of regime survival. There is an ideology 
that informs CCM’s perspective, and Magufuli was its prime exponent. He presents national industrial 
transformation as an imperative and condemns dissent and opposition as inimical to it. In this view, 
political competition and criticism disrupt the peace, distract from governing, breed unconstructive 
complaints, and empower big business. Altogether, they impede the realization of “New Tanzania.” 
Magufuli constantly warns politicians to refrain from what he calls “politics” (meaning contestation) 
and tells them to focus on development. 
To the extent that Magufuli advocated democracy at all, it is a tamed democracy that partly 
resembles the so-called single-party democracy instituted by the very man whose legacy he claimed to 
be restoring: Julius Nyerere. It may be that Magufuli and CCM were cynics who do not believe their 
own rhetoric. Yet it could be the case that they viewed their options through this ideological lens, and 
saw political competition as not only bad for their sustained rule, but also as bad for the restoration 
of Nyerere’s Tanzania. Therefore, 2020’s greater authoritarian turn may have been strategic and 




Magufuli’s death raises the prospect of change in Tanzania’s authoritarian trajectory. This 
possibility depends on whether his death alters the rationales for CCM’s ultra-authoritarian strategy. 
Magufuli’s succession could precipitate a realignment, however partial, in CCM’s leadership. If by 





chance or challenge that realignment elevated politicians that do not share Magufuli’s ideological 
appetite for authoritarianism, these new leaders might initiate democratic reforms. They may also 
inadvertently create a column of “soft-liners” that weaken the regime’s resolve in future 
confrontations with the opposition. 
Nonetheless, the strategic rationale for the authoritarian turn remains. Magufuli’s death does 
not diminish the possibility of opposition recovery. Nor does it make CCM’s prior power strategy 
more sustainable. The 2020 election makes the reasons for CCM to stay the course even stronger by 
giving regime personnel more to fear from investigation and prosecution that would follow any 
opposition victory. Magufuli’s death only compounds the reasons to continue the authoritarian turn. 
First, his popularity lifted CCM’s popularity. Without him, it will be even harder for CCM to 
sustainably win elections without manipulating them. Second, the opposition may seek to test the new 
leadership and expose any loss of resolve. Knowing this, Magufuli’s successors will have reason to 
crack-down harder to show strength. A change of leadership is nonetheless a rhetorical opportunity 
to signal change. The regime may use the presidential succession to feign concessions to ameliorate 
its critics at home and abroad. Therefore, Magufuli’s death may lead to tokens of democratic reform, 
even if no substantive reforms follow. 
Whether or not Magufuli’s death leads to a change in how the regime rules, it is likely to reignite 
struggles within the regime about who rules. In doing so, it will accelerate long-term changes set in 
motion over the last six years. CCM has long been a site of factional struggle. By 2015, amorphous yet 
potent factions had developed inside CCM.31 By 2015, these factions were evenly matched and 
recurrently at war. Magufuli broke this balance of factions and recentralized power in the party and 
state.32 By 2020, his authority within the party seemed nearly absolute. Put otherwise, he had become 
the central column around which hung the regime’s web of alliances. With his death, that web will 




collapse. This will create a moment of struggle as factions vie over how a new one is spun. Whatever 
the outcome of this jostling for position, the authoritarian turn over which Magufuli presided will 
compound the likely intensity of future moments of factional struggle, for three reasons. First, the 
authoritarian landslide of 2020 gives CCM politicians greater to scope to fight one another without 
jeopardizing their party’s position. Second, by concentrating further powers in the presidency, 
especially over economic rents, Magufuli raised the stakes of factional competition. Third, he drew 
the security organs further into the regime’s internal politics. 
The 2020 election also shapes the possible futures of the Tanzanian opposition, which now 
finds itself in a struggle for survival, with no certain outcome. It will have to learn to operate in the 
hostile environment that CCM has reinforced since 2015. Sustaining the vigor of demoralized 
opposition activists will be no small feat. To do so, the opposition must straddle a contradiction: By 
invoking the extremity of CCM’s authoritarianism, the opposition vindicates its democratic argument, 
but also underscores the futility of resistance. The ruling party’s 2020 act of domination poisons the 
opposition’s cause. It makes the chief reason to join the struggle also the chief reason to forsake it. 
The opposition will have to navigate this rhetorical tension amid new questions about which party 
leads it, now that the conventional principle of “most votes and seats” no longer answers. These 
questions are exacerbated by CCM’s continued attempts to “divide and conquer.” 
While it is unclear how the opposition will fare after 2020, it is clearer where opposition 
activities will increasingly take place. Denied access to mass media, rallies, and official posts, 
opposition activists will continue to move online.33 Meanwhile, they will double down on door-to-
door politics, which can be conducted covertly. Yet their wavering members will be reluctant to 
venture into streets that are increasingly hostile. 





In addition to going online and underground, opposition will go international. Voices in the 
diaspora will grow stronger, not only because they alone are beyond the reach of the Tanzanian state, 
but also because many opposition activists have fled Tanzania. There are non-Tanzanian allies to be 
found abroad too. A number of foreign media outlets, activists, NGOs, and scholars have become 
vocal critics of CCM authoritarianism and, in some cases, proponents of the opposition. The 
opposition will also continue to seek the support of multilateral institutions and foreign nations alike. 
“We are asking governments and international organizations,” said Lissu, “to impose targeted 
sanctions, asset freezes and such measures as necessary to put an end to the impunity which has 
characterized the regime.”34 Perhaps in response, the United States imposed visa restrictions on 
unnamed Tanzanian officials responsible for or complicit in electoral fraud. 
I will close by remarking on the significance of Tanzania’s 2020 election further afield. Africa, 
like much of the world, is experiencing a wave of autocratization. Since 2015, Tanzania has repeatedly 
defied democratic norms. Each time, he has met little Western or transnational resistance. This reveals 
that those norms are, apparently, toothless. Autocrats old (such as Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni) and 
new (such as Zambia’s Edgar Lungu) watch Tanzania as they gauge their own latitude to act. 
Eastern and southern Africa are checkered with regimes that were born of violent liberation 
struggles. These postliberation regimes are among the longest-lived and most authoritarian in the 
region. They pursue varying projects, but share a commitment to postponing and taming democracy 
in pursuit of their liberatory programs. Tanzania won its liberation with little violent struggle, at least 
on the mainland. Nonetheless, its regime has endured longer than any postliberation regime. 
Furthermore, Tanzania played a major part in other African struggles for liberation from European 
colonialism and white-supremacist regimes.  




Although CCM is seen as a founding member of the liberation club, it was also widely thought 
to have forsaken any radical agenda. Magufuli’s stylized reinstatement of President Nyerere’s mission 
has raised the possibility that Tanzania is “returning to the fold.” (Looking further afield, Magufuli’s 
move also partly mirrors Xi Jinping’s invocation of the figure of Mao Zedong to justify intensified 
autocratization in China.) Postliberation regimes will interpret the 2020 election as a restoration of 
Tanzania’s liberatory character. Time alone will tell whether this symbolic reembracing of revolution 
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